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Abstract
Edward Chamberlin, who initiated classroom market experiences, used the
results of his experiments to argue that competitive equilibrium performs
poorly in explaining the outcomes of real markets. Vernon Smith altered the
design of Chamberlin’s experiment so as to increase the amount of price in-
formation available to traders and in classroom experiments with this design
found that trading outcomes were close to those predicted by competitive the-
ory. This paper examines results of classroom trading experiments using the
design found in Experiments with Economic Principles [2], an introductory
economics text by Ted Bergstrom and John Miller. The procedure in this ex-
periment is intermediate between that of Chamberlin and that of Smith. We
have collected data on transaction prices and quantities from a large number
of classroom experiments using this design. We compare the experimen-
tal outcomes with the predictions made by competitive equilibrium theory
and by a simple proﬁt-splitting theory. Evidence suggests that neither the-
ory is entirely successful, though in the ﬁrst rounds of trading there seems
to be a signiﬁcant amount of proﬁt-splitting and as traders become more
experienced, outcomes are closer to those predicted by competitive theory.
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student at UCSB.Experimental economics began in the 1940’s in Edward Chamberlin’s
Harvard classroom. Chamberlin devised a classroom trading pit that served
two purposes— instructing the participating economics students and testing
scientiﬁc propositions. Chamberlin “induced” market demand and supply by
distributing cards that assigned each participating student a role either as a
supplier or a demander. Each supplier was assigned a seller cost at which
she could supply a single unit and each demander a buyer value for single
unit of the good. In any sale, the seller’s proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the
price and her seller cost, while the buyer’s proﬁt is the diﬀerence between
his assigned buyer value and the price. Students were asked to move about
the room trying to make the best deal they could with a person of the other
type. When a buyer and seller agreed on a price, the transaction was recorded
on the blackboard for all to see. Trading continued until no more supplier-
demander pairs were willing to make trades.
Chamberlin described his classroom experiments in 1948 in the Journal
of Political Economy [3], but this pathbreaking work received little attention1
until 1962, when Vernon Smith recognized the merits of Chamberlin’s exper-
imental method and followed up with a remarkable series of experiments that
ultimately persuaded much of the economics profession that economics can
be experimental science. Smith’s early experimental work, like Chamberlin’s,
was conducted with students in economics classes. Smith’s account of this
work is found in a charming essay, “Experimental Economics at Purdue,” in
Smith’s Papers in Experimental Economics. [5]
Most experimental economics research is now conducted with paid sub-
jects outside the classroom. There are many good reasons for this, one of
which is that if you are paying subjects, you can subject them to repetitive
activities that tuition-paying students would ﬁnd boring and uninstructive.
1According to the Social Science Citation Index, Chamberlin’s paper was cited only 4
times between 1948 and 1962.
1But the results of classroom experiment are a plentiful source of interesting
data that researchers should not ignore. An advantage of using classroom
experimental data is that the same experiment is often run year after year
and at several diﬀerent universities, generating large samples at low cost.
This paper examines results of a classroom trading experiment designed
by Ted Bergstrom and John Miller and published in an introductory eco-
nomics text, Experiments with Economic Principles [2]. This experiment has
been conducted in several hundred classrooms. For many of these classes the
results have been preserved and recorded in convenient form, since experi-
mental results are typically reported to the students as spreadsheets posted
on the web. We have collected data on transaction prices and quantities
from 31 classrooms at 10 universities for two sessions of a simple demand
and supply experiments.
A Supply and Demand Experiment
In this experiment, each participant is assigned a role as a supplier or a
demander of apples. Suppliers can sell at most one unit (a bushel) and
demanders can buy at most one unit. Each supplier is assigned one of two
possible “seller costs” and each demander is assigned one of two possible
“buyer values” for a bushel of apples. Buyers and sellers are asked to roam
around the room and try to make make as proﬁtable a deal as possible. When
a seller and a buyer agree on a price, they write this price on a sales contract,
along with their identiﬁcation numbers and the seller cost and buyer value.
The market manager records transaction prices on the blackboard for all to
see as the contracts are turned in. If a seller with seller cost C sells a unit at
price P to a buyer with buyer value B, then the seller’s proﬁt is P − C and
the buyer’s proﬁt is B − P.
This experiment included two sessions with diﬀerent distributions of buyer
2values and seller costs. Each session consists of two rounds of trading. In
each session, after the ﬁrst round of trading is completed and students have
observed the results, students are asked to play again with the same buyer
values and seller costs as in the second round. The only thing that is new
in the second round is the experience that participants have gained from the
ﬁrst round.
Competitive Demand and Supply Curves
The number of persons with each buyer value and seller cost diﬀers between
classrooms, depending on the number of students in the class. But the dis-
tribution of types is chosen so that equilibrium prices and the qualitative
features of supply and demand are the same in all classes. In every class
there are two types of suppliers, high cost suppliers with seller cost of $30
and low cost suppliers with seller cost of $10 per bushel. There are also two
types of demanders, high value demanders with buyer values of $40 and low
value demanders with buyer values of $20. In Session 1 there are approx-
imately twice as many low value demanders as high value demanders and
about twice as many low cost sellers as high cost sellers. Figure 1 shows the
competitive supply and demand curve and the competitive equilibrium price
and quantity in for a class 47 students in Session 1. As the graph shows, the
competitive equilibrium price is $20 and the competitive equilibrium quantity
is 15 units sold.
Session 2 has the same two types of buyers and two types of sellers, but
this time there are twice as many high cost suppliers as low cost suppliers and
twice as many high value demanders as low value demanders. In this session,
the competitive equilibrium price is $30. Figure 2 shows the competitive
supply and demand curve and the competitive equilibrium price and quantity
for a class of 47 students.
3Figure 1: Supply and Demand in Session 1
Figure 2: Supply and Demand in Session 2
Comparing Results to Theory
Average Price: Predictions and Outcomes
Participants in the market were told nothing about the distribution of buyer
values and seller costs. They knew only their own values and whatever they
learned from talking to other participants.2 Given that individuals know
2Typically participants have not yet studied the theory of supply and demand. But even
if they understood competitive equilibrium theory, they would know neither the demand
curve or the supply curve and thus could not deduce the equilibrium price.
4little about market conditions when they participate in the ﬁrst round, we
would not expect all transactions to take place at the competitive equilibrium
price.
Figure 3: Average Prices in classrooms: Session 1, Rounds 1 and 2
Figure 3 shows the distribution of classroom mean prices in Rounds 1
and 2 of Session 1, for the 31 classrooms in our study. The competitive
equilibrium price for this session is $20. Even in the ﬁrst round of Session
1, the average price in most classrooms is fairly close to the competitive
equilibrium price. In the second round, as traders learned more about the
prices at which others bought and sold, prices typically moved closer to the
competitive equilibrium prices.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of mean prices in the ﬁrst and second
round of Session 2, where the competitive equilibrium price is $30. Session
2 takes place immediately after the close of Round 2 of Session 1, in which
the equilibrium price was $20. Students were not told that the equilibrium
price in Session 2 would be higher and, as we see from the ﬁgure, in Round 1
of Session 2 students seem to have expected that prices would be lower than
5Figure 4: Average price in classrooms, Session 2, Rounds 1 and 2
the $30 equilibrium price. In round 2, having experienced the outcome of
Round 1, students appear to have adjusted their expectations upward and
the average price in most classrooms moved closer to the equilibrium price.
It is interesting to note that while the modal price in Round 2 of Session 1
was $21 which was $1 above the equilibrium price, the modal price in Round
2 of Session 2 was $28, which is $2 below the equilibrium price.
The average price in a classroom is usually fairly close to the competitive
prediction. In both sessions, in the second round of trading, the mean price
was within $3 of the competitive equilibrium price in 31 of the 32 classes.
Quantity: Predictions and Outcomes
In most classrooms, the number of units sold was close to the competitive
equilibrium quantity. In the second round of trading, the quantity sold was
within one unit of the competitive equilibrium quantity for 21 of the 31
classrooms in Session 1 and for 27 of the 31 classrooms in Session 2. Figures
5 and 6 show the distribution across classrooms of diﬀerences between the
6Figure 5: Quantity Diﬀerence in Session 1
quantity actually sold and the competitive equilibrium quantity.
As these ﬁgures show, the number of trades exceeded the competitive
outcome more often than it fell short. This tendency for “excess trade” was
also remarked by Chamberlin [3]. Chamberlin used a numerical example to
make a plausible case that non-tatonnement pit-trading is likely to lead to
“too much” rather than “too little” trading. He does not provide a proof of
this assertion, nor does he spell out exactly what is to be proved. Bergstrom
[1] states and proves a result that supports Chamberlin’s conjecture.
Earlier Experiments
Chamberlin’s Results
In most classroom market experiments today, experimental results are used to
instruct students about how well competitive theory works to explain market
outcomes. It is interesting to note that Professor Chamberlin, who originated
7Figure 6: Quantity Diﬀerence in Session 2
classroom market experiences emphasized the diﬀerences rather than the
similarities between experimental results and the predictions of competitive
theory. He reports on the results of forty-six experiments conducted in his
Harvard classroom over the years. According to Chamberlin [3]:
“the actual volume of trade was higher than the equilibrium
amount forty-two times and the same four times. It was never
lower. The average price was higher than the equilibrium price
seven times and lower thirty-nine times.
Chamberlin did not supply further details about his results.3 Thus we
do not know whether or not the experimental results were usually “close” to
those predicted by competitive theory. We only know that the predictions
were rarely exactly right and were biased upwards in the case of quantity
and possibly downwards in the case of price.
3He reports that “no statistical computations for the entire sample of forty-six experi-
ments have been made.
8Chamberlin saw no reason to expect that that the outcome in his experi-
ment would approximate competitive equilibrium. He points out that in his
classroom experiments, as in real-world trading, there is no “recontracting”.
Traders do not experience a single equilibrium price, but must trade on the
basis of their own limited information in encounters with others. Thus there
will be some trading at “false prices”. In contrast, the standard accounts of
competitive equilibrium posit a tatonnement mechanism such that no actual
trades occur until an equilibrium price is found.
Chamberlin explained that:
My own skepticism as to why actual prices should in any literal
sense tend toward equilibrium in the course of a market has been
increased not so much by the actual data of the experiment before
us ... as by failure, upon reﬂection stimulated by the problem,
to ﬁnd any reason why it should do so.
Chamberlin’s experimental results correspond to just the ﬁrst round of
our experiment, since he did not oﬀer a second round of trading. Our ex-
periments also diﬀer from his in that he had many distinct buyer values and
seller costs, while our experiment had only two possible buyer values and
two possible seller costs. While our classroom experiments show a tendency
toward excess trading in the ﬁrst round, this tendency is not as strong as
that found by Chamberlin. In the ﬁrst rounds of our two sessions, the vol-
ume of trade exceeded the competitive prediction 36 times, was equal to
the competitive prediction 16 times, and was smaller than the competitive
prediction 10 times. Unlike Chamberlin, even in the ﬁrst round, we did not
ﬁnd a systematic tendency for the average observed price to be less than
the competitive price. In Session 1, the average observed price was usually
higher than the competitive price, while in Session 2, the observed price was
usually lower.
9Smith’s Results
Vernon Smith decided to revise Chamberlin’s procedures so as to give the
competitive model a better chance. Smith explains that:
“The thought occurred to me that the idea of doing an exper-
iment was right, but what was wrong was that if you were going
to show that competitive equilibrium was not realizable ... you
should choose an institution of exchange that might be more fa-
vorable to yielding competitive equilibrium. Then when such an
equilibrium failed to be approached, you would have a powerful
result. This led to two ideas: (1) why not use the double oral auc-
tion procedure, used on the stock and commodity exchanges? (2)
why not conduct the experiment in a sequence of trading ‘days’
in which supply and demand were renewed to yield functions that
were daily ﬂows?” [5]
Smith’s ﬁrst published discussion of the results of his classroom experi-
ments appeared in the Journal of Political Economy in 1962 [4], where he
reports that:
The most striking general characteristic ... is the remarkably
strong tendency for exchange prices to approach the predicted
equilibrium for these markets. As the exchange process is re-
peated ..., the variation in exchange prices tends to decline and
to cluster more closely around the equilibrium.
In Smith’s view, real markets typically “renew” themselves periodically
with buyers and sellers bringing new output and renewed needs to the mar-
ketplace in each trading day. In this process, traders gain knowledge of
market conditions as they move from one day’s trading to the next. Smith’s
10experiments typically included three to ﬁve trading days, corresponding to
the “rounds” in our experiment.
Smith [4] reports the results of ten classroom experiments with diﬀering
shapes of supply and demand curves. Some of these experiments have addi-
tional diﬀerences that make them hard to compare either with Chamberlin’s
experiments or our own. Smith’s ﬁrst four experiments diﬀer from Chamber-
lin’s experiments only in the shape of the demand curves, the use of a double
oral auction, and the use of multiple rounds. In each of these experiments,
the variance of prices decreases from the ﬁrst round to the second and again
from the second round to the third. Across the four experiments on average
the variance in the second round is about 55% of that in the ﬁrst round and
the average of the variance in the third round is about 60% of that in the
second round. Variances in the fourth round are little diﬀerent from those in
the third. In our own sample of classroom experiments, the average ratio of
the standard deviation of prices in the second round to that in the ﬁrst was
about 77%.
Do Classroom Results Really Support Com-
petitive Theory?
The Bergstrom-Miller experimental design follows Smith in adding a second
round of trading. To save classroom time, most instructors do not conduct
a third or fourth round, as did Smith. We follow Chamberlin’s open trading
pit design rather than Smith’s double oral auction.
We have seen that the quantities and average prices found in our class-
room experiments are reasonably close to the predictions of competitive the-
ory. Thus it is usually easy to convince credulous undergraduates that com-
petitive theory has impressive predictive power. But does this conclusion
11withstand closer scrutiny? Might there be a simple competing theory that
works as well or better?
Although competitive theory makes reasonably good predictions of av-
erage prices, we will show that there is a plausible competing theory that
predicts average prices in our classroom experiments more closely. A better
test of the competitive theory and of competing alternatives requires us to
examine the detailed predictions of each theory. It is important to recognize
that competitive theory makes many predictions besides those of total quan-
tity and average price. This theory predicts that all transactions take place
at the same price. It predicts not only the total number of sales but also the
number of trades that will be made by each type of supplier and demander.
Proﬁt-Splitting and Average Price Outcomes
A natural candidate for an alternative to competitive equilibrium theory is
the following “proﬁt-splitting hypothesis.” At the beginning of trade, sup-
pliers and demanders are paired at random. For any pair, if the demander’s
buyer value exceeds the supplier’s seller cost, then the two of them will agree
to a price halfway between the demander’s buyer value and the seller’s seller
cost. If the demander’s buyer value is less than the supplier’s seller cost, then
no mutually proﬁtable deal can be struck and they fail to trade. Those who
do not trade with their ﬁrst partner may search for another partner and if
mutually proﬁtable trade is possible, split the proﬁts with this partner.4
The proﬁt-splitting theory and the competitive theory make similar pre-
dictions about the average prices paid in both sessions. In Session 1, approx-
imately 2/3 of the demanders have “low” values of $20 and 1/3 have “high”
values of $40. About 2/3 of the suppliers have “low” costs of $10 and 1/3
4But as we will see, they will not succeed in ﬁnding a partner with whom they can
trade.
12have “high” costs of $30. If encounters are random, then on average, 4/9 of
the encounters will be between low value demanders and low cost sellers, 2/9
of the encounters will be between low value demanders and high cost sellers,
2/9 will be between high value demanders and low cost sellers and 1/9 will
be between high value demanders and high cost sellers. The proﬁt-splitting
hypothesis predicts that for those matchings in which the buyer’s value ex-
ceeds the seller cost, a sale will take place at a price midway between. The
only individuals who do not make a trade with the ﬁrst person they meet are
the low value demanders with $20 buyer values who meet high cost suppliers
with $30 seller costs.5
In Session 2, about 1/3 of the demanders have low values and 2/3 have
high values, while 1/3 of the suppliers have low costs and 2/3 have high
costs. As with Session 1, we can calculate the fraction of all matchings of
each possible combination of types and calculate the price predicted for such
a matching. Table 1 reports the expected fraction of each possible pairing of
types of buyers and sellers and the price at which such a pair would transact
under the proﬁt-splitting hypothesis.
Table 1: Matching and Prices under Proﬁt-Splitting Hypothesis
Buyer Value Low: $20 Low: $20 High: $40 High: $40
Seller Cost Low: $10 High: $30 Low: $10 High: $30
Predicted Price $15 no trade $25 $35
Fraction, Sess 1 4/9 2/9 2/9 1/9
Fraction, Sess 2 1/9 2/9 2/9 4/9
We use the entries in Table 1 to calculate the expected average price
under proﬁt-splitting. We see that in each session, transactions take place
5Those who fail to trade in their ﬁrst encounter may seek another trading partner, but
the only traders who didn’t ﬁnd a partner in the ﬁrst round will be low value demanders
and high cost sellers, who can not make mutually proﬁtable deals with each other.
13at three distinct prices, $15, $25, and $35, with diﬀering probabilities in the
two sessions. In session 1, the expected average price in each classroom is
$15×4/7+$25×2/7+$35×1/7 = $21.2. A similar calculation shows that in
Session 2, the expected average price in each classroom is $15×1/7+$25×
2/7 + $35 × 4/7 = $29.3
Table 2: Predicted Prices and Experimental Average Prices
Session 1 Session 2
Competitive Prediction $20 $30
Proﬁt-Splitting Prediction $20.7 $29.3
Round 1 Outcome $21.2 $27.0
Round 2 Outcome $21.2 $28.5
Table 2 shows that the experimental outcomes are closer to the predic-
tions of the proﬁt-splitting theory than to those of competitive equilibrium
theory. It is especially interesting that the proﬁt-splitting hypothesis cor-
rectly predicts that the average price in Session 1 will be higher than the
competitive equilibrium prediction and the average price in Session 2 will be
lower than the competitive prediction. Chamberlin [3] observed that in his
classroom experiments, the average price usually exceeded the competitive
prediction, though he was unable to produce a theoretical explanation for
this outcome.
Predicted and Actual Price Distribution
Competitive theory and the proﬁt-splitting theory both make detailed pre-
dictions about the distribution of prices paid in the market. In a competitive
equilibrium, all trades take place at the same competitive price. The proﬁt-
splitting hypothesis predicts that all trades occur at one of three prices, $15,
14$25, or $35. Since our data includes the prices from several hundred indi-
vidual transactions, we can compare the distribution of actual prices in each
round with the distributions predicted by the two theories. This is a much
more stringent test than simple comparison of predicted and actual aver-
age prices across classrooms. Tables 3 and 4 show the predicted and actual
percentages of transactions that are within $1 of each relevant price for the
proﬁt-splitting theory and also those within $1 of the competitive price in
Sessions 1 and 2 respectively. The histograms in Figures 7 and 8 display the
detailed distribution pattern of transaction prices in each round of Session 1
and Session 2.
Table 3: Actual and Predicted Prices, Session 1
Price Range $14-16 $24-26 $34-36 $19-21
Competitive Prediction 0% 0% 0% 100%
Proﬁt-Splitting Prediction 57% 29% 14% 0%
Actual Shares, Round 1 24% 18% 6% 20%
Actual Shares, Round 2 16% 19% 2% 30%
Table 4: Actual and Predicted Prices, Session 2
Price Range $14-16 $24-26 $34-36 $29-31
Competitive Prediction 0% 0% 0% 100%
Proﬁt-Splitting Prediction 14% 29% 57% 0%
Actual Shares, Round 1 7% 20% 8% 32%
Actual Shares, Round 2 2% 24% 8% 42%
The proﬁt-splitting theory predicts far more trades at the “extreme”
prices $15 and $35 than are actually observed. In Session 1, this theory
predicts that 57% of all trades will be at $15 and about 14% will be at $35.
15Figure 7: Price Distribution in Session 1
In Round 2 of this session, the fraction of prices that were within $1 of these
prices are respectively 16% and 2%. Proﬁt-splitting theory predicts that in
Session 2 about 57% of trades will be at $35 and about 14% at a price of
$15. In Round 2 of Session 2, the actual percentages of trades at these prices
are are 8% and 2% respectively. Although the data appears to reject the
hypothesis that all (or even a majority of) traders are proﬁt-splitters, the
spikes observed at $15, $25, and $35 in Figures 7 and 8 suggest that at least
a few traders do behave like proﬁt-splitters.
Does the competitive theory fare any better in explaining this data? The
competitive theory predicts that all trades take place at a single competitive
price. But in Session 1, only 20% of all trades are within $1 of the competitive
price in Round 1 and 30% in Round 2. This performance improves in Session
2, where 32% of all trades are within $1 of the competitive price in Round 1
and 42% in Round 2.
In both sessions, we see that trades tend to take place at prices closer
16Figure 8:
to the competitive predictions in Round 2, after traders have observed the
Round 1 prices at which others traded. We also see that prices in both
rounds of Session 2 are closer to the the competitive predictions than in
Session 1. As Figure 7 shows, in the second round of Session 2 the modal
price is the competitive equilibrium price of $30. Session 1 is the ﬁrst market
experiment that most participants have ever experienced. It appears that
with the trading experience that they gained in the two rounds of Session
1, participants act more like competitive traders when they reach Session 2.
Given Smith’s ﬁndings about the continued convergence of prices toward the
competitive equilibrium through the ﬁrst three rounds of trading, it seems
likely that if we had a third round of trade in each session, prices would
approach equilibrium more closely. These results suggest that it might be
worthwhile for this experiment to be run with three rather than two rounds
per session.
17Predicted and Actual Quantity Distribution
The competitive theory and the proﬁt-splitting theory predict not only the
total number of transactions, but also predict the number of trades between
each possible pair of types of trading partners. From the demand and supply
schedules in Figure 1 we see that in competitive equilibrium, every low cost
supplier and no high cost suppliers will trade. We also see that all high value
demanders and some low value demanders will trade. Therefore in competi-
tive equilibrium, the the number of trades between high value demanders and
low cost suppliers is equal to the total number of high value demanders and
the number of trades between low value demanders and low cost suppliers
must equal the diﬀerence between the total number of low cost suppliers and
the number of high value demanders. In competitive equilibrium there are
no trades involving high cost suppliers.
From Figure 2 we see that in competitive equilibrium for Session 2, every
high value demander and no low value demanders will trade, and that every
low cost supplier and some high cost suppliers will trade. In equilibrium
the number of trades between high value demanders and low cost suppliers
equals the number of low cost suppliers and the number of trades between
high value demanders and high cost suppliers equals the diﬀerence between
the number of high value demanders and the number of low cost suppliers.
There will be no trades involving low value demanders.
The proﬁt-splitting theory predicts that suppliers and demanders meet
at random and trade on their ﬁrst encounter if the demander’s buyer value
exceeds the supplier’s seller cost. If the number of suppliers and of demanders
are equal, then everyone will meet somebody of the other type on a ﬁrst
encounter. The only pairs who do not trade on their ﬁrst encounter are low
value buyers matched with high cost sellers. It follows that those who fail to
trade on a ﬁrst encounter will not ﬁnd anyone with whom they can make a
proﬁtable trade on later encounters. Given the fractions of low and high cost
18suppliers and low and high value demanders, we can calculate the expected
number of pairings of each type.6
Enough detailed data was collected about trading outcomes so that we
can compare detailed quantity outcomes with the theoretical predictions of
the two competing theories. These predictions and actual results for Sessions
1 and 2 are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5: Predicted and Actual Quantities in Session 1
Buyer Value Low: $20 Low: $20 High: $40 High: $40 Total No.
Seller Cost Low: $10 High: $30 Low: $10 High: $30 Trades
Comp. Equil. 197 0 241 0 438
Price-Splitting 290 0 145 73 508
Actual, Rd 1 221 9 207 34 471
Actual, Rd 2 218 0 209 38 465
Table 6: Predicted and Actual Quantities in Session 2
Buyer Value Low: $20 Low: $20 High: $40 High: $40 Total No.
Seller Cost Low: $10 High: $30 Low: $10 High: $30 Trades
Comp. Equil. 0 0 241 201 442
Price-Splitting 74 0 148 296 518
Actual, Rd 1 26 6 218 211 461
Actual, Rd 2 18 2 218 213 451
It is interesting to notice that although price outcomes change substan-
6Because of variations in the number of students who come to class, the number of
suppliers and demanders were not exactly equal in all classes. We take a simpliﬁed ap-
proximation by calculating appropriate fractions of the minimum of the total numbers of
demanders and suppliers across all experiments. Numerical experiments suggest that the
magnitude of the diﬀerences implied by such an elaboration is small.
19tially between round 1 and round 2, there is relatively little change in the
number of trades taking place between matched pairs of each type. In almost
every case where the two theories make diﬀerent predictions, the outcome is
closer to the prediction of competitive equilibrium than to that of the proﬁt-
splitting theory. In each case, however the actual outcomes are between the
two predictions.
Conclusions
In Chamberlin’s experiment, demanders and suppliers traded only once in a
decentralized pit-trading environment. In Smith’s experiment, trading was
by a public double oral auction, and traders acted in three or more “trading
days” where in each new trading day, participants faced the same market
conditions as on previous days but with the common experience of the previ-
ous days’ trading. Chamberlin found his experimental results to be far from
the predictions of competitive equilibrium theory, while Smith found that
after three rounds of trading, prices were closely concentrated around the
competitive price.
In the real world, organized commodity markets and stock markets seem
to be best approximated by Smith’s design in which trading is public and
experienced traders trade repeatedly in an environment where market fun-
damentals change little from day to day. In some markets the fundamentals
of demand and supply may change so rapidly that the prices paid in previ-
ous periods oﬀer little information to traders about the prices that they can
expect in the current period. These markets may behave more like Cham-
berlin’s experiment with a single round of trading.
The design of the classroom experiments studied here is intermediate be-
tween that of Chamberlin and that of Smith. These experiments use Cham-
berlin’s pit-trading method rather than Smith’s double oral auction. These
20experiments include two rounds of each session rather than Chamberlin’s one
or Smith’s three or more.7 For these classroom experiments, competitive the-
ory predicts total quantities and average transaction prices quite well. But
even in the second round, a signiﬁcant number of trades take place at prices
substantially diﬀerent from the equilibrium price. In the ﬁrst round of either
session, many participants appear to split proﬁts equally with the trading
partner they happen to be paired with. In the second round, proﬁt-splitting
becomes less common, but does not disappear. Although neither the com-
petitive theory nor the proﬁt-splitting theory satisfactorily explains detailed
outcomes in the two rounds of each session, it appears that as traders become
more experienced with market conditions, their behavior becomes more like
that predicted by competitive theory and less like that predicted by proﬁt-
splitting.
7Our demand and supply curves were simpler than those of Chamberlin and Smith. We
had only two types of demanders and two types of suppliers while Smith and Chamberlin
each had many distinct buyer values and seller costs.
21References
[1] Theodore C. Bergstrom. Chamberlin’s excess trading conjecture. Tech-
nical report, University of California Santa Barbara, 2004.
[2] Theodore Bergstrom and John Miller. Experiments with Economic Prin-
ciples: Microeconomics. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2000.
[3] E.H. Chamberlin. An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political
Economy, April:95–108, 1948.
[4] Vernon L. Smith. An experimental study of competitive market behavior.
Journal of Political Economy, 70(2):111–37, April 1962.
[5] Vernon L. Smith. Experimental economics at Purdue. In Vernon L.
Smith, editor, Papers in Experimental Economics. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, England, 1991. Originally appeared in Essays in Con-
temporary Fields of Economics, edited by G. Horwich and J.P. Quirk
Purdue University Press, 1981.
22